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TORTS-UNAUTHORIZED AUTOPSY-NoN-SURVIVAL OF ACTION-Plaintiff's 
husband was struck and killed by a motorbus owned and operated by de-
fendant municipality. The body was removed to a hospital maintained by 
defendant. Subsequently, at the request and direction of a physician em-
ployed by defendant, an autopsy was performed, apparently to determine 
whether the deceased had been drinking. During the examination certain 
organs were removed and destroyed. Plaintiff brought an action for dam-
ages on the ground that the mutilation was done without her consent and 
in violation of her legal right to the possession of the body. Plaintiff died 
while the action was pending, and her administrator continued the suit. 
Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied, and judgment and 
verdict were for plaintiff. On appeal, held, reversed, with direction to set 
aside and dismiss. While there is a cause of action in the surviving spouse 
for unauthorized mutilation of her husband's body, it was error to deny 
defendant's motion because such right did not survive the death of plain-
tiff. Deeg v. City of Detroit, 345 Mich. 371, 76 N.W. (2d) 16 (1956). 
All American courts that have considered the question have recognized 
that a cause of action lies for the intentional and unpermitted mutilation 
of a corpse, and damages for mental anguish may be recovered.1 While 
1 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Simpkins v. Lumbermans Mut. 
Casualty Co., 200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E. (2d) 733 (1942); Steagall v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 
(D.C. Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 352. See generally 52 A.L.R. 1446 (1928); Weinmann, "A 
Survey of the Law Concerning Dead Human Bodies," BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL 
REsEARCH CouNCIL, No. 73 (1929). It is doubtful whether there may be recovery for 
mental anguish for a mere negligent interference. See 12 A.L.R. 342 (1921); Green, 
"Relational Interests," 29 ILL. L. R.Ev. 460 at 487 (1934). 
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there is accord as to the existence of the right, the basis of the liability is not 
clear. Most of the courts have described it as akin to a property right,2 
others have characterized it as a right to have the body delivered for burial 
without mutilation,3 while others have used combinations of both.4 How-
ever, it is apparent that the courts recognize that such an act reasonably 
and, indeed, normally causes real mental suffering and therefore are willing 
to award compensation.5 The problem of who may maintain the action has 
not been answered fully, though reliance on property considerations gen-
erally has led to the conclusion that the person entitled to the custody of 
the body for burial may maintain the action. Such a right has been recog-
nized in the surviving spouse, mother, father, or next of kin. 8 It is not clear 
whether the right is held jointly by the survivors or exclusively by a par-
ticular individual, but it would appear doubtful that the right is held 
severally.7 There is authority allowing members of the immediate family 
to join in the action.8 If the basis of the action, however, is a willful act 
causing mental anguish, then it would seem that any survivor sufficiently re-
lated to the deceased to suffer mental anguish should have an individual 
cause of action. The application of property concepts to determine who 
may maintain the action is inconsistent with allowing compensation for 
mental anguish, and can be justified only as a means of limiting the de-
fendants' liability.0 The Michigan court appears to be the first to hold 
that the action does not survive either at common law or under the Michi-
gan type survival statute.10 This is in accord with the theory that the action 
is based on the infringement of a personal right and is not related to any 
2 For example, Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904), describes it as 
property subject to a trust and limited in its rights. Mensinger v. O'Hara, 189 Ill. App. 
48 (1914), recognizes a property right authorizing the nearest relatives to take possession 
and control of the body for the purpose of burial. 
8Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551, 37 N.Y.S. 471 (1896); Keyes v. Konkel, 119 Mich. 
550, 78 N.W. 649 (1899) (dictum). 
4 Patrick v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 251, 118 S.W. (2d) 
116 (1938); Larson v. Chase, note 1 supra. 
5 See Magruder, "Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts," 49 
HARv. L. REv. 1033 at 1064 (1936); Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: 
A New Tort," 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 at 885 (1939). 
6 Larson v. Chase, and Simpkins v. Lumbermans Mut. Casualty Co., both note 1 supra. 
7 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933), noted 
in 19 CoRN. L. Q. 108 (1933). 
s England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920); Philips 
v. Newport, 28 Tenn. App. 187, 187 S.W. (2d) 965 (1945). Contra, Steagall v. Doctors 
Hospital, Inc., note I supra. 
9 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, note 7 supra. 
10 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §612.32. In Lubin v. Sydenham Hospital, Inc., 42 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 654 (1943), however, a mother's action for damages for mental anguish due to the 
refusal to deliver her child's body for burial was held to survive under the New York 
statute, which provides that "No cause of action for injury to person or property shall 
be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed." 
N.Y. Decedent Estate Law §119 as amended, Laws 1941, c. 897. On survival of tort 
actions generally, see Evans, "A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort 
Claims for and against Executors and Administrators," 29 MICH. L. REv. 969 (1931). 
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property concepts.11 The court compared it to actions for libel, slander, 
and malicious prosecution, none of which survive under the Michigan 
statute or at common law.12 It is a matter of speculation whether this 
court's recognition of the action as personal, divorced from property con-
cepts, is indicative of a willingness to acknowledge fully that recovery 
should be allowed to all members of the family whose relationship to de-
ceased is such that they reasonably may be expected to suffer mental anguish 
from the tortious act. It is submitted, however, that such a course would 
be proper and in accord with the theory of the action.16 
Lee H. Snyder 
11 Huntly v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 201, 
280 P. 163 (1929). 
12 Principal case at 378, citing authority. 
13 However, the impact of a recent Michigan statute requiring the consent of only 
one of an enumerated group of persons for the performance of an autopsy, if more than 
one of such group assumes custody of the body, remains to be seen. Mich. Comp. Laws 
(1954 Supp.) §328.151. 
